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Abstract—Natural disasters occur unpredictably and can range
in severity from something locally manageable to large scale
events that require external intervention. In particular, when
large scale disasters occur, they can cause widespread damage
and overwhelm the ability of local governments and authorities to
respond. In such situations, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
is essential for a rapid and robust Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR) operation. These type of operations bring
to bear the Command and Control (C2) and Logistics capabilities
of the military to rapidly deploy assets to help with the disaster
relief activities. Smart Cities and Smart Environments, embedded
with IoT, introduce multiple sensing modalities that typically
provide wide coverage over the deployed area. Given that the
military does not own or control these assets, they are sometimes
referred to as gray assets, which are not as trustworthy as blue
assets, owned by the military. However, leveraging these gray
assets can significantly improve the ability for the military to
quickly obtain Situational Awareness (SA) about the disaster
and optimize the planning of rescue operations and allocation
of resources to achieve the best possible effects. Fusing the in-
formation from the civilian IoT sensors with the custom military
sensors could help validate and improve trust in the information
from the gray assets. The focus of this paper is to further examine
this challenge of achieving Civil-Military cooperation for HADR
operations by leveraging and fusing information from gray and
blue assets.
Index Terms—Civil-military cooperation, humanitarian assis-
tance and disaster relief, security, smart cities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters occur unpredictably and can range in
severity from something locally manageable to large scale
events that require external intervention. In particular, when
large scale disasters occur, they can cause widespread damage
and overwhelm the ability of local governments and authorities
to respond.
In such situations, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is
essential for a rapid and robust Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR) operation. These type of operations
bring to bear the Command and Control (C2) and Logistics
capabilities of the military to rapidly deploy assets to help
with the disaster relief activities.
Increasingly, CIMIC operations will take place in Smart
Environments, such as Smart Cities, which rely on the
widespread deployment of Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors
and actuators and on pervasive computing solutions to enable
smarter living and to assist the citizens’ day-to-day activi-
ties [1]. CIMIC activities will be performed not only in support
of HADR, but also in the context of defence and counter-
terrorism operations.
Smart Environments could be useful for CIMIC operations.
For instance, the sensor-rich environment coupled with an-
alytic and alerting services can help identify trouble spots,
suspicious behavior by people, suspicious vehicles that might
contain explosives or other harmful materials, and infras-
tructure failures. Furthermore, archived data can be used for
forensic analysis after undesirable events occur. Predictive
analytics could even help identify failures or other issues ahead
of time, enabling preemptive action.
However, building effective CIMIC solutions has histori-
cally been proven to be a difficult endeavor, even when little
automation and technology sophistication is required. This is
due to both technical (i.e. incompatible civilian and military
technologies) and non-technical factors (i.e. different organi-
zational cultures and trust relationships) [2], [3]. Although
increasing use of COTS products and commercial standards
within the military can reduce some technical compatibility
challenges, developing CIMIC solutions for smart environ-
ments and for real-time systems integration is still a formidable
organizational and engineering challenge, especially due to
significant security and trust issues.
This paper investigates the challenges of achieving CIMIC
for HADR operations while countering potential adversarial
activities in Smart Environments. To this end, the authors
leverage their experience from the NATO Science and Tech-
nology Organization (STO) IST-147 Research Task Group
(RTG) on Military Applications of IoT. The paper begins
with a discussion about the role of Smart Environments for
HADR operations, analyzes the characteristics of Smart Envi-
ronments, and then discusses the opportunities and challenges
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they present. Finally, the paper proposes a roadmap towards
bridging the gap between Smart Environments and CIMIC
operations.
II. DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SMART
ENVIRONMENTS
The concept of Smart Environments refers to the adoption
of immersive Information and Communications Technology
(ICT) solutions in our everyday lives to enable smarter living
and to assist our day-to-day activities. Currently, Smart Cities
represent the most important Smart Environment implementa-
tion, as they provide a new generation of real-time and time-
critical, location-, social-, and context-aware services to their
digital citizens, e.g., for emergency and healthcare, surveil-
lance, entertainment, and social good. Private companies and
governments at all levels are continuing the deployment of
new capabilities to provide an ever increasing array of smart
services to their citizens and residents [4].
Smart services implement sophisticated data analytics and
information dissemination functions on top of a distributed
architecture of software components. The architecture com-
prises of fixed sensor systems, mobile nodes nomadically
roaming and interacting with one another opportunistically,
edge devices located in proximity of raw data sources and
information consumers, and the Cloud. To this end, smart
services build on top of 3 pillars: IoT, distributed analytics,
and heterogeneous communications.
IoT arguably represents the main enabling technology for
smart services [5], [6]. More specifically, a capillary network
of IoT sensors enables the collection of large quantities of
environmental data, while at the same time making for a
quickly deployable and expendable platform. The growing
sophistication and the decreasing cost of technology for sen-
sors and actuators implies that more and more of our living
environment will become ”smart” [7].
In smart services, the raw data generated by IoT devices
is analyzed through distributed computation solutions. In
fact, Fog Computing has recently supplanted Cloud-centric
approaches, allowing IT service developers and providers to
allocate (a portion of the) information-processing tasks at the
edge of the network [8]. Fog Computing solutions leverage
a plethora of different edge devices, including IoT gateways,
Cloudlets or Micro-Clouds, and Multi-Access Edge Comput-
ing to realize coarse grained but low latency data analysis and
limit the amount of data flow throughout the network realm
[9].
Finally, smart services implement exploit dynamic and het-
erogeneous communications. The emergence of heterogeneous
networks in LTE/4G infrastructures [10], and in the consequent
interest towards device-to-device (D2D) communications [11],
is expected to intensify as 5G communications will be de-
ployed. Also, a growing number of smart services, especially
in smart grid applications, have started leveraging novel com-
munication solutions, such as Long Range (LoRa) and Long
Range Wide Area Networks (LoRaWAN) (both based on Chrip
Spread Spectrum), Wireless M-Bus, Sigfox, and NarrowBand
IoT (NB-IoT), designed for long range, low power, and low
bit rate operations [12].
As a result, Smart Environments are characterized by a
continuously and rapidly evolving software infrastructure, in
which multiple smart services execute concurrently, competing
for the available (and often scarce) bandwidth, computation,
storage, and energy resources, and often implement different
types of analytics on the same input data and need to deliver
their results to different sets of users [13].
Smart services typically have different administrative do-
mains. In fact, multiple entities own Smart City assets and
services: some of them are publicly owned, but we envision
that in the future many private players will operate in the Smart
Environment market. Those will include platform providers
that offer Cloud or Fog resources that can be used for
computation and service providers that offer a wide array of
smart services. Each entity is likely to adopt different access
and interoperability policies for their ICT infrastructure.
In turn, smart services can be highly heterogeneous from the
point of view of their access/entry point. In fact, the increasing
adoption of virtualized resources and networks, propelled by
the development of sophisticated network slicing solutions
designed for 5G [14], allow providers to adopt any kind of
isolation policy for their assets and services and to enforce
access only from controlled entry points (such as a ReST API
implemented in the Cloud).
Smart Environments could prove to be immensely useful
during CIMIC operations such as HADR, in particular to
quickly obtain SA about the affected areas, and then to
monitor the conditions and the recovery process. However,
their complex nature presents a wide array of challenges that
need to be addressed in order to successfully leverage Smart
Environment capabilities in CIMIC.
III. DATA FUSION IN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
Data fusion in disaster relief is a process of correlating
sensor data, with the objective of creating overall Situational
Awareness (SA) about disaster environment. For example, in
a smart city environment traffic camera feeds collected over
time and space can be fused in order to identify the movement
path of a particular object or set of objects. Multisensor data
fusion [15] refers to a process where data coming from more
than one type of sensors is fused. For example, information
from microphones and seismic sensors can be fused in order to
identify direction and type of moving objects, such as vehicles
or human groups.
Data fusion has been intensively studied, in context of both
military and civilian applications, resulting in development of
a wide range of models and methods [16]. Several, often com-
plementary, data fusion methodologies have been proposed,
including information-based models [17], [18], activity-based
models [19]–[22], and role-based models [23]. In military
domain applications of data fusion have been particularly
focused on development of a so-called common operating
picture (COP), used to create SA of the battlespace.
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The JDL data fusion model [24] was specifically proposed
to support military applications. The 1998 revision divides
data fusion into the following 5 levels: Level 0 Sub-object
assessment; Level 1 Object assessment; Level 2 Situation
assessment; Level 3 Impact assessment; and Level 4 Process
refinement. An additional level, Level 5 User refinement, has
been proposed in order to support trust, workload, attention,
and SA of the human users [25]. The JDL data fusion
model provides a robust approach to data fusion. However,
its primarily target has been the recognition and identification
of objects in the physical domain.
NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4162 [26]
defines a standard technical characteristic of the NATO Identi-
fication System (NIS) Identification Data Combining Process
(IDCP). The IDCP consists of four major sub-functions: 1)
data association and track data correlation; 2) single source
processing; 3) fusion; and 4) final identity category decision.
The NIS IDCP accepts identification from multiple sources,
associates incoming identification information to a specific
track, including any existing information on that track, and
converts the identification information into a form suitable
for combining it in order to provide an Identity Category
recommendation to the operator. In addition to representing
battlefield entities, a track can be interpreted as any set of
information, which is assumed to be related to the same
entity. In principle, all types of identification data sensors and
sources can provide input to the IDCP, and the output of the
IDCP function is to be in a form suitable to meet various
user applications. The operator (or so-called Identification
Authority) is responsible for the final identity decision and
is able at any time to manually override an identity provided
from the IDCP.
Although the above mentioned data fusion models are
widely used in military context they are only partially appli-
cable to fusion of civilian and military data as encountered in
disaster relief operations. In particular, although they were suc-
cessfully used to fuse data of various quality and accuracy, the
common assumption in the existing data fusion applications is
that the data is collected only from trusted sources and any
errors are mainly due to potential malfunctions or are random
in nature. The trust relation is achieved via separate means
and protocols, such as an appropriate sensor authentication and
protection of communication channels, as well as revocation
of compromised sensors. This can be technically achieved in
a controlled environment operated by a single entity, however
it is much more difficult in the case of data obtained from
independent and uncontrolled sources.
During past CIMIC operations, the ability of leveraging
technology to perform surveillance and reconnaissance has
been identified as a mission-critical capability [27]. As a
consequence, it is vital that in any future operation, military
forces and emergency services can effectively interconnect
with locally available sensing capabilities, including both civil-
ian smart infrastructure as well as crowd-sourced information
from privately owned devices. Such interconnection might
not always be possible without deploying additional technical
capabilities. Similarly, it might be necessary to augment the
existing local sensing capability with some additional sensors
and actuators. As HADR operations are typically performed
in an environment that is either hostile or difficult to control,
ideally any such additional capabilities would rely on inexpen-
sive, commercially available devices that could be exposed to a
significant risk of destruction or capture by hostile operatives.
At the same time, a federated CIMIC SA solution needs to
provide an adequate level of security and in particular ensure
protection of integrity and availability as well as assessment
of trustworthiness of the obtained information.
Therefore, the challenges to achieving a federated smart
CIMIC environment are threefold. First, technical interoper-
ability between devices, networks, and applications has to be
achieved. The wide heterogeneity of ownership, administrative
responsibility, resource isolation, and interoperability policies
in Smart Environment services and assets makes the task to
bring homogeneity in this picture very challenging. The idea
of bringing these multiple platforms, owners, and implementa-
tions together to enable interoperabilty at the time when they
are urgently required such as in HADR operations is very
difficult to realize. This is particularly the case for the military,
which has its own sets of tools, techniques, and oftentimes
stove piped systems for ICT. Also, military ICT assets tend to
remain separate for civilian ICT assets owing to security and
trust issues.
Second, the solution needs to be able to operate in a
degraded ICT environment, possibly without or with limited
access to external power and to the Internet. Instead, the
devices would need to rely to a large extent on battery
power, self-charging, or opportunistic charging techniques.
Communication may rely mainly on ad hoc and peer-to-peer
patterns, where connection to wide area networks is provided
by infrequent edge nodes. Due to this limitation, an appropriate
trade-off between local and centralized data processing and
aggregation has to be achieved, e.g. relying on a fog computing
paradigm and appropriate delegation of the computing load to
the edge nodes.
Third, the specific challenges related to security and trust
management need to be effectively addressed. As this is one
of the main objectives of our work, a more detailed discussion
of these challenges and possible solutions is provided in
Section IV.
IV. SECURITY-SPECIFIC CHALLENGES
There are several security challenges related to fusion of
data obtained from grey and blue assets - as well as to per-
forming data fusion processes and operations during disaster
relief operation in general.
A. Secure handling and processing of information
At a high level, leveraging existing grey IoT capabilities
implies that the military will be relying on IoT sensors,
effectors, and services that are owned by third parties, such as
municipal governments, utility companies, or other commer-
cial enterprises. This data will be transmitted over networks
792
and links that are also not owned and controlled by the
military. Traditionally, any sensor system deployed by the
military has built-in mechanisms to detect and protect against
tampering. Likewise, communication links are typically en-
crypted to prevent a variety of attacks that are possible at
the network level (e.g., spoofing, man-in-the-middle, denial of
service, etc.). None of these assumptions hold true for grey
assets.
As discussed in Section III, during a disaster situation
the available civilian information processing capability can
be severely degraded. An obvious approach is to import the
grey data into the military CIS and perform data aggregation
and analysis there. However, the military CIS would typically
operate on a confidential or secret level and therefore the
import of the data needs to be performed via an appropriately
configured gateway device. The gateway will be implemented
either as a one-way information transmission device, called
a data diode, or a restrictive two-way information mediation
device, called a guard. Both types of these devices introduce
limitations on protocols and data formats that can be mediated
through them. In particular, the data diodes do not allow for
any end-to-end communication and feedback from the receiver
- the connection is terminated at the data diode and behavior
of any TCP-based protocols or any other protocols requiring
feedback need to be simulated. Similarly, data acquisition via
a data diode can only rely on a push from the data source.
Moreover, it is of vital importance that potentially malicious
or misformatted content coming from the untrusted domain
not be allowed adversely affect military systems. In order
to provide such protection, the gateway devices inspect the
content during the mediation process and usually allow only
a very limited set of data formats and protocols to crossover
from the untrusted domain into the military domain. However,
the implication is that these restrictions introduce additional
limitations with respect to interoperability, especially when
taking into account the vast and somewhat ad-hoc IoT-related
protocols, technologies, and data formats used in practice.
An alternative to processing information in the military
domain is offered by performing data fusion in the civilian
domain, and in particular in some of the public cloud envi-
ronments. These public cloud services often provide extraor-
dinary availability and performance, including scalability and
elasticity of resources, suitable for performing most complex
data fusion tasks. In the disaster response situation, the role
of military responders would be potentially to restore and
maintain network connectivity between local assets existing in
the disaster zone and the public cloud. All data aggregation and
fusion could be performed in the public cloud. This removes
the need for importing unclassified data obtained from the
civilian sensors to classified or otherwise secured systems
operated by the military. Moreover, it also potentially enables
much better interoperability with the civilian assets, as many of
the public cloud IoT processing systems offer built-in support
for a large set of IoT protocols.
However, the challenge here is how to ensure secure pro-
cessing of potentially sensitive military data in the public
cloud systems, so that fusion process could be performed
efficiently. In particular, confidentiality and integrity of the
data obtained from the military sensors would need to be
ensured, while being processed in civilian systems. There are
two basic approaches to performing such secure computation
in an untrusted environment.
Firstly, the computation can be performed within secure
enclaves, which are fully separated by the trusted hardware
from the other processes executed at the same platform and
are accessible and administered only by the owners of the
enclaves. Several recent R&D efforts within industry and
academia have focused on development of such secure remote
computation solutions, e.g., [28], [29]. These solution are
based on specific extensions included in the modern processor
platforms, such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV).
Secondly, the computation can be securely performed on
untrusted hardware, using advanced security cryptographic
methods. The solutions of interest include partial and full
homomorphic encryption, multi-party computation, and for-
mat/order preserving encryption [30]. However, the ability
to perform more sophisticated data analytics and fusion is
severely limited by the currently available cryptographic solu-
tions. In addition, the overhead introduced by these methods
vary depending on complexity of performed operations. For
example, simple operations, such as search, addition, or aver-
age can be performed relatively efficiently and quickly over
the encrypted data [31].
It is also possible to implement a mixed solution, where data
obtained from military sensors is fused within the classified
systems and only sanitized results of this partial fusion are
released to civilian domain for further fusion with civilian data.
However, such solution limits significantly the scope of data
fusion that can be achieved and therefore the usefulness of the
obtained results.
B. Trustworthy and dependable data fusion
The implementation of the fusion process in the mixed
civilian military environment brings several security chal-
lenges on its own, primarily arising from limited, or unknown,
trustworthiness of information obtained from the grey assets.
The straightforward inclusion of such data into the fusion
process could lead to data poisoning and opens up an attack
vector that can be exploited by an adversary.
At the very least, any military C2 system that interfaces
with the civilian IoT capabilities must track the pedigree
of any data originating or traversing these systems all the
way to the military commander who might be basing his
or her decisions on such data. The underlying threats of an
adversary influencing or affecting this information need to be
understood and mechanisms need to be developed to counter
such threats. Resilient data analytics and adversary-resistant
artificial intelligence methods need to be investigated in order
to make sure that malicious data sources cannot unduly affect
or influence overall decision making.
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In most CIMIC use cases, integrity, availability, and trust-
worthiness of information are the most critical aspects from the
perspective of enhancing SA. While availability and integrity
of data are fundamental prerequisites, they are not sufficient
on their own for enabling an effective fusion of the data and,
consequently, providing meaningful support to the decision
making process. In order to obtain a reliable and trustworthy
operational picture, while relying on heterogeneous sets of data
sources, operated by independent entities, it is important to be
able to document data provenance. This additional information
can be used in order to ensure that an operational picture is
not poisoned by malicious or erroneous information - thus
ensuring maximum use of local information sources, while
minimizing the risk introduced by incorporating such external
knowledge into more trusted military and government systems.
In addition, confidentiality protection might also be an
important factor in some cases. This might be due to regulatory
compliance requirements [32] as well as due to building
trust with the civilian population or protecting identities of
participants.
In CIMIC scenarios, it is often infeasible to rely on the
classical public-key infrastructure (PKI) for authentication of
all parties. One of the main reasons for this is that in most
cases a PKI common to all participants (especially common
for both the military and civilian entities) would not exist.
Moreover, there might not even be a common root of trust
that could be used to build such common PKI - and there
might be no technical capabilities to build and operate such
an infrastructure, due to challenges related to issuance of
trusted public key certificates and to validation of their revo-
cation status. Therefore, there is a need to explore alternative
mechanisms for building and maintaining trust, such as dis-
tributed ledgers [33]. These alternative solutions however have
to take into account operating under adversarial conditions
- and need to minimize computational and communication
overhead introduced into the system. This consideration means
that blockchain solutions based on proof-of-work would not
be suitable in most cases for use in HADR and military
operations.
C. Information sharing
As disaster relief operations would usually involve a high
level of civil-military cooperation, the information sharing
between military and civilian responders is of paramount
importance. This might include in particular the results of
the data fusion process, which might be also relevant to
civilian participants. However, in the option where data is
ingested from the civilian domain into the military domain
and data fusion takes place in the military domain, releas-
ing fused information back to the civilian domain is non-
trivial. in order to be releasable back to the civilian domain,
from where some of the input data has been obtained, the
resulting data has to be assessed for their releasability and
properly and securely labeled as releasable information. Such
machine readable labelling can ensure that the information
can be automatically processed by the guard devices on the
edge of military system and released to the civilian counter-
partiesin a timely. Unfortunately, an integrated approach to
releasability assessment and labelling of the data obtained
during the various phases of the data fusion process is not
widely implemented at the moment in military CIS. Although
some individual building blocks, such as common values and
syntax for the metadata information, as well as standardized
mechanisms for trustworthy binding of this information to the
data objects, have been recently developed, the process of
labelling and release are still largely manual and separated
from the data generation process.
D. Resilience
Equally important is the resilience of any proposed solution.
While HADR scenarios do not present the same hazards
of battlefield operations, they still pose significant threats at
the system integrity and survivability levels. In fact, CIMIC
operation might involve subsystems that have experienced
significant stress and that are partially compromised or mal-
functioning – especially on the civilian side.
As a result, CIS for CIMIC operations should be able to
operate with components degraded. This includes an ability
to effectively recover from potential security breaches and
restore capabilities in a timely manner. In particular, the
interconnection of military and civilian systems should not
lead to significant reduction of cyber resilience within the
military domain. This is also because it is not appropriate
to rule out adversarial activities, given that even in HADR
scenarios, adversaries may be trying to exploit the degraded
capabilities of the overall system in order to exploit it for their
own goals and purposes.
V. PROPOSED APPROACHES TO DATA FUSION IN
CIVIL-MILITARY COLLABORATION
There are several examples of public-private collaborations
involving acquisition of information from privately owned
sensors for the sake of supporting emergency response and
maintenance of order. For example, the Dutch Camera in beeld
program provides Dutch police with voluntary access to over
200,000 private surveillance cameras in the Netherlands in
the case of an emergency [34]. Some similar solutions, such
as Amazon Ring’s Neighbors and Vivint’s Streety, have also
been implemented in the US, and involve voluntary sharing
of recordings from smart video door bells and home cameras
with the local community and police [35].
Other examples of crowdsourced sensing are provided by
air traffic monitoring platforms, such as FlightAware and
Flightradar24 [36], and meteorological sensors, such as Ne-
tatmo [37]. Use of localized peer-to-peer overlay networks in
the context of smart disaster response systems has been also
investigated in [38]. One use of geo-located social media data
for crowd detection has been discussed in [39].
However, all these solutions are limited in their scope, either
focusing on single types of sensors (e.g. cameras, ADS-B
receivers, meteorological sensors) or on a particular vendor
(e.g. Ring, Vivint, Netatmo). Moreover, they are sometimes
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introducing questionable security and privacy practices, thus
potentially endangering the willingness of community mem-
bers to voluntarily join these systems [40].
Therefore, there is a need to develop a comprehensive
approach to private-public and CIMIC collaboration in the
event of emergency situations in smart environments. More
specifically, interoperability for smart services could be sig-
nificantly facilitated by the introduction and implementation
of appropriate standards at their design time – an aspect that
the architects of Smart City services should carefully consider.
At the same time, smart service designers and providers
should consider resilience as an important objective and plan
for interoperability under disaster conditions. More specifi-
cally, they should carefully evaluate whether the advantages, in
terms of security and maintainability, offered by strict access
control and resource isolation policies, are offset by an easier
exploitation of smart services and assets in disaster recovery
operations. Perhaps an interesting tradeoff could be the imple-
mentation of a breaking glass policy, whose triggering enables
direct access to IoT assets, to support disaster operations.
VI. SCENARIOS AND CHALLENGES TARGETED BY THE
NATO STO IST-147 AND IST-176 RTGS
The NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)
IST-147 Research Task Group (RTG) on Military Applications
of IoT explored the applicability and utility of IoT in the
military domain. During its three year duration, the activities
of this group, which included experiments, demonstrations,
and workshops, have established that IoT has a significant
role to play in future military operations and collaborative re-
silience, including HADR operations, counter-terrorism, smart
physiological monitoring of soldiers, and logistics and supply
chain management.
In particular, the group focused on the problem of exploiting
IoT capabilities and technologies to significantly increase the
speed and breadth of obtaining SA for military operations. For
example, in the event of a natural disaster in a future smart city
environment, being able to tap into the plethora of sensors and
intelligent services within the city could enable the Military to
gather SA much faster than relying solely on custom deployed
sensing and information gathering. IoT is being deployed to
monitor everything from weather to power grids, traffic flow,
public transportation, water quality, air quality, noise pollution,
medical services, and many other aspects. Being able to tap
into and leverage such an information rich environment could
be invaluable for future military operations.
Demonstrations given by IST-147 group utilized the data
obtained from both grey and blue assets. Among the problems
that were identified, the most important was assessing the trust-
worthiness of information gathered from public/private sources
like street cameras, city API sources, civilian smartphones, and
meteorological sensors. There is no general solution that could
have been applied in a straightforward manner. The classical
security consideration to isolate systems from untrusted data
was not an option in the SA scenario.
Fig. 1. Video image from street camera in Warsaw with 518 line bus
annotated.
Instead, we decided to adopt a location-based cross-
validation technique. For example one of the data sources that
was made publicly available by the Warsaw city was the public
transport information. The service gives the opportunity to get
the GPS location of all the trams and buses in the city area.
In conjunction with information about the GPS coordinates of
street cameras, it is possible to validate the camera readings by
checking if the bus or tram is visible in the particular field or
not – see Figure 1. We note that this type of cross-validation
technique requires time synchronization between information
sources because the data aggregator receives data with differ-
ent propagation delays and is thus incapable of reconstructing
the originating transmission time. In the considered scenario,
the video image can be gathered in real time, but the bus
locations are updated every 60 seconds. As a result, in order
to validate if the data sources are coherent a video image buffer
must be applied. If the data received from them is consistent,
grey information sources can be marked with higher trust
levels; if not, the sources should be classified as untrusted or
outright ignored. A similar validation scheme can be applied
to verify sensor data readings coming form different service
providers.
The next challenge that naturally arises is to investigate
different approaches to integrate these vast and disparate
IoT systems and capabilities into existing Military Command
and Control (C2) systems. Without systematic approaches
to integrate these capabilities, it would be very difficult to
leverage IoT capabilities in support of military operations.
Two popular approaches to enabling IoT exploitation within
Military C2 systems are to either define new standards for
Military IoT or to leverage the multitude of existing stan-
dards and enable federation and interoperability between these
different systems. The former approach is challenging given
the proliferation of existing standards and systems that are
already in vogue. Defining new standards may make it more
challenging to leverage existing capabilities. However, some
common interfaces and data models may be necessary to
enable interoperability with existing NATO and member nation
C2 systems. In particular, one promising approach would be
to expand NATO’s Federated Mission Networking (FMN) to
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support interoperability between commercial and civilian IoT
systems and FMN.
Another identified shortcoming has been the lack of stan-
dards and the challenges of discovery to identify, connect,
and leverage these Smart City IoT capabilities. Many cities
and municipalities define their own standards for how this
information is made available to their residents, and one off
integration with each of these standards is not tractable. Hence
decentralized and federated discovery capabilities need to be
explored to alleviate these challenges.
The group has also been examining existing IoT standards,
as well as STANAGs, and identifying those that would be wor-
thy of either leveraging or interfacing with, developing refer-
ence architectures to enable interoperability with both military
and civilian IoT, and exploring the range of possibilities of
how to exercise C2 over IoT assets in a federated environment
(including articulation / tasking). In the context of security,
an example of such an approach could be combining civilian
blockchain technologies, such as Hyperledger or Ethereum,
with STANAGs 4774 and 4478 in order to provide a trusted
information management approach for IoT systems used in
CIMIC applications.
Future work for CIMIC related activities will be performed
in the context of the recently created IST-176 RTG on Feder-
ated Interoperability of Military C2 and IoT Systems, which
will succeed the soon to be deactivated IST-147 RTG and build
on its results. In particular, the focus will be on the following
topics:
1) To examine existing IoT standards, as well as existing
STANAGs, architectures, and best practices to better
understand how to integrate commercial and civilian IoT
technologies and capabilities into Military C2 systems,
and in particular NATOs Federated Mission Networking
(FMN) architecture.
2) To further define the use-cases/scenarios, interfaces, and
practical usability of IoT based solutions for disaster
relief operations in future Smart City environments.
3) To explore the challenges of discovery of commercial
IoT capabilities and services, given the relative lack of
standardization.
4) To identify security challenges and develop mitigation
strategies for those challenges when interfacing military
C2 and civilian IoT infrastructures and when performing
fusion with or otherwise relying on data coming from
various sources of information.
5) To experiment and demonstrate, through proof-of-
concept trials, the benefits and ability to integrate civil-
ian IoT and military C2 systems, especially in the
context of HADR and providing collaborative resilience.
6) To engage in standardization activities in the civilian
space, for example with the IEEE Smart Cities initia-
tives.
In particular, the plan is to develop realistic CIMIC sce-
narios that will serve as the basis for exploration and ex-
perimentation. The results of this experimentation activities
will be used to engage standardization efforts within the
commercial and civilian IoT domain. A related side topic will
be to examine the use of low-cost and COTS IoT devices for
both civilian as well as military applications. Special effort
will be dedicated to development of mechanisms necessary
to interface commercial and civilian IoT with military C2
systems. These mechanisms include a federated discovery
mechanism and necessary interfaces / extensions to support
integration of IoT with Federated Mission Networks (FMN).
The group will continue to address two key challenges in
the security and communications domains. Security challenges
include potential threats and vulnerabilities that could be ex-
ploited by adversaries. Communications challenges are related
to both connectivity (e.g., interfacing military networks with
commercial networks via gateways) and resource constraints
(e.g., with tactical edge networks).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Increasingly, disaster relief operations will take place in
environments with high penetration of IoT devices. Informa-
tion acquired from such Smart Environments can significantly
contribute to improved situational awareness, both in terms
of speed and coverage, leading to better triage and allocation
of resources for the rescue and recovery operations. Smart
Environments and predictive analytics could provide a range
of benefits, including effective monitoring of the recovery
operations, and the potential to help identify failures or other
issues ahead of time, enabling preemptive action.
There are several important organizational, policy, and tech-
nical challenges that need to be overcome in order to materi-
alize our vision of smart disaster relief operations. Technical
challenges include interoperability between commercial IoT
systems and military devices and networks, which tend to be
stove-piped and isolated from the Internet. Another challenge
is the ability for these systems to continue to operate in a
degraded environment, which is often the case in the event of
a large-scale disaster. However, even if the interoperability and
operational challenges are solved, the critical enabler for the
civil-military cooperation continues to be ability to assure the
required security and trust levels. In particular, the challenges
related to secure data handling and processing, dependable
data fusion, sharing of data fusion results, and ensuring
resilience of the complete solution need to be successfully
tackled.
Developing creative and effective solutions to the above
challenges requires establishment of a wider R&D collabo-
ration. We have initiated such a collaboration within NATO
STO IST-147 working group and we plan to extend it further
within the follow up NATO STO IST-176 activity.
REFERENCES
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